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Abstract
Aim: The scientific objective of this study is an attempt to clarify the institutional aspects 
of the functioning of the labour market in Germany that are relevant to the response 
to the global economic crisis of 2008–2009.
Motivation: The reaction of German labour market was totally different than during pre-
vious recessions and the explanation of the sources of this response constitutes the main 
motivation to undertake this study. The considerations rely on the thesis that it could 
be attributed to the institutional infrastructure combined with clever economic policy 
of the state and responsible behaviour of social partners. The economic theory suggests 
how an isolated institution functions, but in the real world they works in the whole insti-
tutional network. Therefore the broader context and some linkages are mentioned.
Results: After a brief review of the main macroeconomic indicators and selected labour 
market institutions in Germany in comparison to the OECD countries, the labour market 
reforms undertaken in the period between 2002 and 2007 will be discussed. Then, select-
ed on the basis of literature studies, institutional buffers of the labour market mitigating 
shocks are examined with particular emphasis on the instruments of internal flexibility, 
social partners’ behaviour and institutional connections of labour markets with other do-
mains of economic order. The elements of institutional framework are subject to qualita-
tive analysis backed up by available official statistical data.
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1. Introduction
The unemployment rate in Germany after reaching a peak of 12.1% in 2005 
began to decline steadily, and the improvement of the situation on the labour 
market followed even in the face of the global economic crisis after 2007. These 
positive trends, especially in comparison with other EU countries, draw at-
tention and are discussed in the literature. Naturally, the situation on the la-
bour market largely depends on the overall macroeconomic background before 
the crisis, and in Germany in the spring of 2008 it was very good: unemploy-
ment was continuing to decline, employment was growing (chart 1), a consoli-
dation of public finances took place and since the autumn of 2008 the economy 
was supported by low interest rates, and the main problem was the lack of qual-
ified personnel.
Secondly, an active employment and the labour market policy is praised 
in the face of the crisis. Last but not least, the institutional aspects of the German 
labour market are emphasized. A very different reaction of the labour markets 
of the developed countries to the crisis of 2008–2009 suggests that it is worth 
doing a deeper analysis of their institutional conditions. Due to their specific-
ity, labour markets constitute an area of special regulation, imbued with for-
mal and informal institutions that determine their function (Balcerzak, 2009a, 
pp. 100–101; 2009b, pp. 75–88). Institutional framework of the labour market 
in Germany has been thoroughly reformed since 2002, which affected the way 
of reacting to the shock caused by the crisis — other than usual in Germany 
and different from most developed countries. An attempt to explain these con-
ditions is a research objective of the study.
2. Current state of knowledge — labour market institutions 
‘matter’, but how?
As indicated by Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), labour market institutions have 
an impact on how employment and unemployment react to negative shocks. 
For example, a better coordination in the wage bargaining may lead to faster 
adjustments in real wages relative to productivity growth slowdown. According 
to this approach, institutional differences illustrate different reactions of the la-
bour markets to shocks.
Comparing the data on GDP decline in the first quarters of the crisis 
(2009/2009) and the increase in the unemployment rate in OECD countries, 
we do not notice any discernible pattern. For example, Spain experienced less 
than an average decline in GDP, however the unemployment reacted very 
strongly, while in Germany the decline in GDP was sharp, but the unemploy-
ment rose the least. This indicates clearly how differently labour markets reacted 
to the negative shock. These differences can be largely explained by a diverse 
configuration of labour market institutions.
  EKONOMIA I PRAWO. ECONOMICS AND LAW, 15(3): 371–383
373
It is claimed that the German labour market shows a relative level of rigidity, 
even taking into account the wave of deregulation and reforms (Balcerzak & 
Rogalska, 2009, pp. 40–48). This view can be based on a theoretical analy-
sis of how labour market institutions — considered in isolation — have impact 
on the state of equilibrium level of employment on the labour market. This is 
illustrated by the data in table 1 — the higher the expected level of employment, 
the higher the rank. For example, high protection against dismissal ranked 
Germany in 26th place, while the ratio of minimum wage to the median wage 
(before the introduction of the national minimum wage) — in first place. The 
average of the first six indicators presented in the table 1 has placed Germany 
in 18th place in the group of 27 developed countries.
According to the presented indicators when the crisis erupted in 2008, 
German labour market institutions did not allow to expect good employment 
results. This shows that their connection plays an important part; similarly, 
the institutional ties of the labour market play such a role — with other domains 
of economic life in the economic order as a whole, such as social security sys-
tems, taxation and education.
3. The methodology of research
For the purpose of the chosen research problem the most appropriate method 
is an institutional analysis. It allows to consider the organisational frame-
work of the labour market in the wider context. The totally different reaction 
of the German labour market to the exogenous shock in comparison to the pre-
vious recessions suggest the crucial role of the changed institutional environ-
ment. Thus, the reforms and their effects were shortly described. In the paper 
the labour market institutions in Germany are examined, selected on the ba-
sis of literature studies. The elements of institutional framework are subject 
to qualitative analysis backed up by available official statistical data. The results 
are good starting point for more detailed numerical examination.
4. The research process
The analysis starts with the labour markets reforms changing the institutional 
framework and working incentives. It will then focus on following areas: instru-
ments of within-firm flexibility implemented to maintain the stable employ-
ment, the behavior of social partners and, finally, dual educational system.
4.1. Labour market reforms before the crisis and their effects
The reforms have improved the efficiency of labour market institutions in terms 
of creating new jobs, both those affecting the supply side and the corporate 
sector.
  EKONOMIA I PRAWO. ECONOMICS AND LAW, 15(3): 371–383
374
In the case of employees they strengthened the incentives to take up em-
ployment and participation in the labour market, especially for a low-wage seg-
ment. The replacement rates and reservation wage were lowered (Arent & Nagl, 
2001). According to the OECD statistics, it lowered the NAIRU, which in 2005 
was at 8.1% and in 2010 only at 7.1%. Changes in the structure of incentives 
require that a labour market links with the social security system and tax sys-
tem are taken into account. These relationships are mutually reinforcing — if 
the situation on the labour market improves, tax revenue grows and social se-
curity systems are supported. This also works the other way round — reducing 
taxes and non-wage labour costs encourages to take up jobs and create jobs.
The second aspect of the reforms is to improve the matching efficiency, 
which is reflected by the inward Beveridge curve shift. In the period 2007–
2009 both the unemployment rate and the rate of job vacancies fell. This can 
be mainly attributed to the Hartz I–III reforms which, among others, abolished 
the job placement monopoly of the Federal Employment Agency.
The created incentives for longer working life clearly increased the employ-
ment rate of older workers, and — unlike during previous recessions — reduced 
the unemployment rate. Between 2007 and 2014, the employment rate in the age 
group of 55–64-year-olds gradually grew from 51.3% to 65.6% and clearly ex-
ceeded the OECD average. Accordingly, the activity rate also increased from 
57.2 to 69.1%. The measures have succeeded in bringing down the long-term 
unemployment, a traditional problem group on the German labour market. In 
2007 the unemployed who stayed without a job for over a year accounted for 
almost 57% of the total, and this share began to gently fall to 44.3% in 2014.
The reforms have improved the situation of enterprises which could better 
than ever before surround their most valuable employees, carriers of human 
capital, with security buffer (table 2). This buffer includes instruments enhanc-
ing the internal and external flexibility. External flexibility is achieved through 
the instruments used in the enterprise in order to adapt headcount to their ac-
tual needs (quantitative flexibility), mainly through hiring and firing, but also by 
various forms of atypical forms of employment such as fixed-term or temporary 
work. The non-renewal of fixed-term employment is a typical strategy to protect 
the key regular workers. In Germany the group most affected by the crisis were 
temporary agency workers, because in the period 30/09/2008–03/09/2009 
their employment decreased by about 20%; by contrast, employment in the in-
dustry decreased by only about 4%.
In the face of the crisis in Germany the internal flexibility played a more 
important role. It is based mainly on adapting the volume of work to production 
requirements by adjusting the working time of employees. It is also based on bal-
ancing the organization of work and work qualifications. In contrast to the ex-
ternal flexibility it does not need to affect the number of employees. External 
and internal flexibility can complement, as well as substitute each other. The 
necessity of the quantitative adjustment of employment to changes in demand 
for products and services the company is conditioned, among other things, by 
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wage rigidity. In Germany, wages are largely determined by the tariff systems 
and are difficult to quickly change at the company level. Besides, a constant 
wage adjustment to changing conditions is not very convenient for the firm. 
The inflexibility of wages encourages the use of overtime and short-time work, 
the firing and hiring of staff, as well as the use of various forms of short-term 
employment.
4.2. Internal flexibility — working time control
The instruments used by the companies based on the reduction of working time 
included two main groups of tools: use of working time accounts and the use 
of subsidies to employment in the form of so-called short-work (Kurzarbeit).
Working time accounts enable better working hour management in the peri-
ods of fluctuations in demand. To mitigate the effects of fluctuations best suited 
are the models that allow the accumulation and spending of surplus time 
in the long run, e.g. a year. The popularity of this instrument is growing, as 
in 1999 35% of the workforce had such account and in 2009 already 51%. In 
2009 in the EU27 38% of establishments with 10 or more employees used some 
form of flexitime scheme with possibility of taking free time, in Germany it was 
about 52% (Eurofound, 2009, p. 7). The research on work councils (workforce 
representation), conducted twice by Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliches 
Institut (Fall 2009 and Spring 2010), indicates that exactly one-third of enter-
prises made use of the time accounts in order to secure employment (Zapf & 
Herzog-Stein, 2011). Companies entered the crisis with full accounts, which 
naturally created an opportunity to spend the accumulated hours and compen-
sate for the time off, and even to enter the negative zone. In Germany the in-
strument is used primarily by industrial companies (almost a half of them) and, 
to a lesser extent, the service ones (approx. 25%). The accumulation time limits 
are higher in the industry. The collapse of industrial production during the crisis 
was stronger than in the services, which indirectly proves that this instrument 
was widely used to protect jobs (Zapf & Herzog-Stein, 2011).
Short work allows an employer to lower time and labour costs and creates an 
alternative to layoffs during the inevitable short-term adjustments in the econ-
omy. Working hours can be reduced up to 100%, and this solution compen-
sates employees for the loss of 60% of net wages lost due to the time reduction. 
The employer receives funds from the Federal Employment Agency. Social In-
surance Contributions are usually paid by the employer and employee in half; 
in this case they are fully taken over by the employer. During the crisis, half 
of the employer’s contribution was paid by the Agency. Normally the permit 
for an introduction of this instrument due to the cyclical reasons is obtained for 
6 months, but during the crisis this period was prolonged up to 24 months. The 
use of the instrument is flexible for the company, but it must include a min-
imum of one-third of the crew, for a minimum of 4 weeks with a minimum 
of 10% reduction in working time (this requirement was suspended from 2009 
  EKONOMIA I PRAWO. ECONOMICS AND LAW, 15(3): 371–383
376
to 2011). The instrument can be used when all standard measures such as re-
duction of overtime, leave, transfer of workers to other parts of the company 
have been exhausted. Furthermore, the implementation of work summary must 
be approved by a works council, due to the fact that changes in working con-
ditions must be co-decided. The council may also request the implementation 
of the short work and in case of an employer’s refusal; call the arbitrator (Ein-
igungsstelle). One of the functions of works councils is to take measures aimed 
at avoiding layoffs. In small companies or in situations where there is no works 
council, short work as the change in working conditions must be accepted by 
individual employees.
The number of employed in the system of short work had increased sharply 
and in 2009 on average amounted to more than a million. In their case work time 
shortened on average by one third, which in terms of all employees amounted 
to 15.5 hours (compared to 1.8 in 2008). The reserves on time accounts fell by 
more than 9 hours and the number of overtime hours by 13. In 2009 the num-
ber of people employed part-time also increased by 220 thousand (1.8%), while 
full time posts were reduced by approximately 240 thousand (1%). The volume 
of working time in the economy fell by 2.9% and this was mainly caused by 
the reduction of working time (rather than a reduction in the number of posts). 
All this demonstrates the wide range of measures relating to working time used 
to secure employment.
In 2007–2009, the reduction of annual working time was on average almost 
45 hours on the jobholder, almost 19 hours of which was due to the change 
of tariff or company working time, and on a smaller scale due to the short work, 
reduction of overtime and time accounts (Herzog-Stein & Seifert, 2010, p. 555). 
In the period from 2000 to 2009 the annual working hours per employee fell 
from 1387 to 1309 hours, or by 6%, most of which in just 2009 alone. The de-
crease in labour utilization meant that productivity per hour decreased, provid-
ing some reserve capacity for the incoming recovery.
According to the Institute of Employment Research in Nürnberg, average 
annual working time in 2009 fell by 3.2% because of short work and the use 
of temporary accounts (Instituts für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, 2010). 
This decrease corresponds arithmetically to the 1.2 million jobs that have been 
preserved. The other researchers’ analyses, covering the period from 2008 
to June 2009, confirm the effectiveness of the instrument (Boeri & Brücker, 
2011, pp. 697–765). The extension of the period of analyses by a year does not 
bring such clear results for the changes in employment levels to differ signifi-
cantly between companies applying and not applying the short work (Kruppe 
& Scholz, 2014). This means that the effectiveness of the instrument in the em-
ployment protection may not be as high as it is supposed to be. Similar conclu-
sions were reached by M. Burda and J. Hunt (2011, pp. 273–335), who argue 
that the reduction of working time from 2008 to 2009 substituted for tradi-
tional government-sponsored short-time work.
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The instrument is effective in a particular context. In the case of the analysed 
crisis it is indisputable that the recession affected mostly export-oriented sec-
tors, especially the industry. Germany, unlike the other developed countries, 
has preserved its industrial base almost unchanged (in terms of contribution 
to GDP), this sector has for long suffered from a shortage of highly qualified 
specialists, thus was particularly interested in keeping them (labour hoarding). 
This explains a high popularity of short work — in mid-2009 the industry em-
ployed 4/5 of all workers covered by this instrument.
To summarize the effects of reduced working time during the crisis, one 
should conclude that they allow, at least in the short term, to secure jobs. Sub-
sidized employment and emptying time accounts, is much more beneficial 
on a macro scale than lay-offs due to the stabilization of household income. 
Therefore, short work and time accounts can be regarded as automatic stabiliz-
ers, protecting other workers as well, in the economy through stabilizing aggre-
gated demand.
4.3. The behaviour of the social partners — informal pact for 
employment
Since 1998 government and social partners (trade unions and employers’ or-
ganisations) have been conducting regular talks in the framework of the tri-
partite pact for work (Bündnis für Arbeit, Ausbildung und Wettbewerbsfähigkeit). 
Their aim was to improve the institutional framework of the labour market, in-
cluding the issues of vocational training, working hours flexibilisation, reduc-
tion of overtime, the introduction of Kombilohn (subsidized jobs in the low-wage 
sector) etc. The pact collapsed in the spring of 2003 due to the insurmountable 
differences between the unions and employers’ organizations.
After 2000 the employers’ organizations have been more active and de-
manded an extension of working time and other arrangements to their benefit. 
From 2002 to 2003 the recession initiated the discussion on a more flexible tar-
iff systems. While in some industries the opt out clauses in collective agreement 
allowing different solutions (Öffnungsklauseln) gave some leeway to individual 
firms, in other industries derogation from the regional collective agreement 
(Flächentarifvertrag) were permitted only in exceptional economic circum-
stances. It turned out that the minimum standards imposed on the industry as 
a whole constitute a bottleneck, leading to the erosion of bargaining coverage. 
Many firms prefer to stay out of agreements, but still use them as a benchmark 
in wage bargaining process. In 2003 Chancellor Schröder (2003) threatened 
the tariff partners that if they do not make the tariff systems more flexible in or-
der to give the opportunity to implement solutions at the company level, the leg-
islature will enter. In response to this threat in the metal industry, electricity, 
and later in others industries, opening clauses have been introduced, not only 
in crisis situations.
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For Germany, basing its growth on export, international competitiveness is 
crucial, and its primary indicators are unit labour costs. In the pre-crisis period 
from 2003 to 2007, these costs were falling, while e.g. in the United States, 
France and Britain they were growing. Labour costs in the period from 2000 
to 2009 increased by 15.7%, labour productivity by 8.1%, while nominal unit 
labour costs by 7%, and in real terms (adjusted by the GDP deflator)  — fell 
by 3.8% (Lesch, 2010, p. 3). This phenomenon has caused a number of pos-
itive consequences: increased international competitiveness and low pressure 
on prices allowed for low nominal interest rates, which in turn sustained ag-
gregate demand. The decline in real labour costs stimulated demand for labour 
and the volume of working time.
The decline in unit labour costs can, to a large extent, be attributed to the be-
haviour of social partners. The German model of industrial relations is based 
on cooperation between employers’ organizations and trade unions, and at 
a company level — their cooperation with works councils. This does not elim-
inate, of course, collective labour disputes, but unlike in the other developed 
countries, the relationships are more consensual and less confrontational (Dust-
mann et al., 2014, p. 177). Trade unions have demonstrated an exceptional level 
of discipline when it comes to wage demands, and the bargaining process re-
sulted in relatively moderate wage growth. In turn, employers saved the jobs 
in spite of low capacity utilization. The state helped by subsidizing the jobs more 
generously than usual within the short work and by maintaining stable social 
security contributions level. Thanks to the coordinated actions it has succeeded 
to ‘fire the hours, not the workers’ as the chief of IG-Metall union stated (Hu-
ber, 2009, p. 12).
4.4. Institutional linking of the labour market with other domains 
of economic order — an example of dual educational system
For a developed country, Germany shows an exceptionally low youth unem-
ployment rate. Although it increased slightly (to 11.3%) in 2009, the downward 
trend has been maintained and in 2014 the unemployment rate in the age group 
of 15 to 24 was 7.8%, while in the entire OECD almost twice as high. By con-
trast, in Spain the rate in 2007 was 18%, while in 2012 more than 50%.
Germany’s success is attributed to the dual system of education, which is an 
interesting institutional solution to facilitate the transition between vocational 
education and real professional life. This solution is the result of a long evolution 
initiated already in the nineteenth century by enterprises and formally imple-
mented into legislation in 1922 (Neumann, 2010, p. 56). The system involves 
the business sector in the education system, demand a financially support from 
companies, but allows to equip young people with the skills needed by the in-
dustry. Moreover, the system is backed by the Federal Institute for Vocational 
Education and Training (Bundesinstitut für Berufsbildung), which conducts re-
search and development, provides services and advice. Although the number 
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of participants in the system decreases in the long run and it requires to be re-
formed, its idea generally works and still serves its purpose.
5. The results of research
The reforms undertaken by Germany in 2002 changed the institutional in-
frastructure and prepared the labour market for the crisis. What has been 
improved? First of all, the structure of incentives to take up and maintain 
employment and to provide the firms with the tools of internal and external 
flexibility. Within these interrelated institutions, labour market actors — en-
terprises and employees and their representations  — could (and wanted to), 
with the support of the state, withstand the most severe recession in decades. 
The crisis confirmed the intact social partnership as a prior condition for tack-
ling the problems of absorbing the enormous shock in GDP. Before and dur-
ing the crisis the workers and their representatives were ready to accept lower 
wages and to reduce the working time which helped to avoid redundancies. The 
government did not hesitate to use short time work — an ‘old’ labour market 
policy instrument  — which has been temporary tuned up to the exceptional 
conditions.
6. Conclusion
The growing convergence among the developed countries in terms of the re-
lationship between production and employment (Okun’s law) observed since 
the 70s has collapsed (Daly et al., 2013). The emerging differences among econ-
omies in the face of crisis are a very general measure, which indicates that in-
stitutional and industrial relations ‘matter’ for the capacity to absorb shocks 
and for a short-term and long-term growth path. For the science it is a chal-
lenge not only to analyse individual institutions but to capture their interactions 
and to explore their relationship to other elements of the economic order.
The German labour market during the Great Recession proves that 
the direction of change of the labour market institutions chosen at the beginning 
of the 2000s was accurate and should be continued. In this context, the intro-
duction of the minimum wage at the beginning of 2015 should be seen as contra-
dictory to the logic of up-to-date practice, given that the German labour market 
will still face many challenges such as long-term unemployment, improving op-
portunities for employment of the low-skilled or inclusion of the waves of im-
migrants. This will require further deliberate (re)constructing of institutions. 
What is important: the institutions must be flexible and give the government 
the room for manoeuvre, as in the case of Kurzarbeit.
The German example shows that intersystemic competition can be a source 
of learning for other countries, which is particularly important for the Eurozone 
and the success of European integration. Although efficient copying of institu-
tions — due to their interdependence — is not a simple matter, but there should 
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be attempts to adapt some solutions such as linking the education system more 
closely with the work practice as in the model of dual educational system.
References
Arent, S., & Nagl, W. (2001). Unemployment Benefit and Wages: The Impact 
of the Labor Market Reform in Germany on (Reservation) Wages. Ifo Work-
ing Paper, 101.
Balcerzak, A.P. (2009a). Wpływ działalności regulacyjnej państwa w obszarze 
kreowania ładu konkurencyjnego na rozwój nowej gospodarki. In A.P. Bal-
cerzak, & M. Moszyński (Eds.). Aktywność regulacyjna państwa a potencjał 
rozwojowy gospodarki. Toruń: Polskie Towarzystwo Ekonomiczne Oddział w 
Toruniu.
Balcerzak, A.P. (Ed.). (2009b). Polski rynek pracy w warunkach integracji europe-
jskiej. Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek.
Balcerzak, A.P., & Rogalska, E. (2009). Effectiveness of Polish Labour Market: 
Taxonometric Analysis of European Union Countries in the Years 2004–
2007. Research Papers of Wrocław University of Economics — Global Challenges 
and Policies of the European Union — Consequences for the ‘New Member States’, 
59.
Blanchard, O., & Wolfers, J. (2000). The role of shocks and institutions 
in the rise of European unemployment: the aggregate evidence. The Economic 
Journal, 110(462). doi:10.1111/1468-0297.00518.
Boeri, T., & Brücker, H. (2011). Short-time work benefits revisited: 
some lessons from the Great Recession. Economic Policy, 26(68). 
doi:10.1111/j.1468-0327.2011.271.x.
Burda, M.C., & Hunt, J. (2011). What Explains the German Labour Market, 
Miracle in the Great Recession? Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1.
Daly, M.C., Fernald, J., Jorda, O., & Nechio F. (2013). Labor Markets 
in the Global Financial Crisis. FRBSF Economic Letter, 38.
Dustmann, C., Fitzenberger, B., Schönberg U., & Spitz-Oener A. (2014). From 
the Sick Man of Europe to Economic Superstar. Journal of Economic Perspec-
tives, 28(1). doi:10.1257/jep.28.1.167.
Eurofound (2009). European Company Survey 2009. Retrieved 12.05.2014 from 
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu.
Herzog-Stein, A., & Seifert, H. (2010). Der Arbeitsmarkt in der Großen Rez-
ession — Bewährte Strategien in neuen Formen. WSI Mitteilungen, 11.
Huber, B. (2009). Zukunft der Gewerkschaften  — Zukunft der Arbeits-
gesellschaft. In Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (Ed.), Zukunft der Gewerkschaf-
ten — Zukunft der Arbeitsgesellschaft. Bonn: Bonner Dialog.
Hüfner, F., & Klein, C. (2012). The German Labour Market Prepar-
ing for the Future. OECD Economics Department Working Papers, 983. 
doi:10.1787/5k92sn01tzzv-en.
  EKONOMIA I PRAWO. ECONOMICS AND LAW, 15(3): 371–383
381
Instituts für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (2010), Retrieved 12.05.2014 
from www.iab.de.
Kruppe, T., & Scholz, T. (2014). Labour hoarding in Germany Employment 
effects of short-time work during the crises. IAB-Discussion Paper, 17.
Lesch, H. (2010). Lohnpolitik 2000 bis 2009 — Ein informelles Bündnis für 
Arbeit. IW-Trends, 1.
Neumann, K.T. (2010). Einsatz für die Zukunft. Handelsblatt, 12.05.2014.
Rinne, U., & Zimmermann, K.F. (2012). Another Economic Miracle? The Ger-
man Labor Market and the Great Recession. IZA Journal of Labor Policy, 1(3). 
doi:10.1186/2193-9004-1-3.
Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwick-
lung (2013). Jahresgutachten 2013/14, Retrieved 12.05.2014 from https://
www.sachverstaendigenrat-wirtschaft.de.
Schröder, G. (2003). Regierungserklärung vor dem Deutschen Bundestag am 
14. März 2003. Mut zum Frieden und Mut zur Veränderung. Bulletin der 
Bundesregierung, 21–1, 14.03.2003.
Zapf, I., & Herzog-Stein, A. (2011). Betriebliche Einsatzmuster von Arbeitsze-
itkonten während der Großen Rezession. WSI-Mitteilungen, 2.
Acknowledgements
Author contributions: author have given approval to the final version of the article.
Funding: this research was fully funded by the statutory sources.




Institutional labour market indicators in 2008 — the position of Germany in the group 
of 27 OECD countries
Index A B C D E F G H
Position 26 10 18 1 14 26 19 27
A: protection against dismissals (OECD EPRC-index); B: the share of temporary employment in total 
employment; C: replacement rate; D: the ratio of minimum wage to the median wage; E: bargaining 
coverage; F: tax wedge; G: subindex ‘labour market efficiency’ of the World Economic Forum CGI 
index; H: Index of labour market regulation by Fraser Institute.
Source: Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung (2013, p. 
258).
Table 2.
Labour market reforms in Germany in 2002–2007
Reform/Date Main measures Likely effect
Job-AQTIVE Law
1.01.2002
Training: changes in benefit claims during and after partici-
pation;
Job placement: profiling, aptitude tests, assignment of third 
parties;
Compulsory registration for those threatened with unemploy-
ment;
Changes in responsibility of job offers.




Training: introduction of voucher, stricter selection criteria;
Deregulation of temporary employment;
Cut in unemployment assistance;
Compulsory registration as job seeker at the time of layoff 
notification;
Further changes in reasonability of job offers;
Tightening of rules for exclusion from benefits.
Improved job search 
efficiency;




Reorganization of the Federal Labour Agency;
Legislative changes concerning job creation schemes;
Alteration of unemployment benefit legislation;
Further tightening of rules for exclusion from benefits.




Combination of unemployment assistance and social assistance 
into new means-tested unemployment benefit system;
Introduction of One-Euro-Jobs.
Raising work incentives for 
welfare recipients
02.2006 Shortening unemployment benefit duration for older workers.
Increase work incentives 
for older workers10.2006 Phasing out of early retirement options.
05.2007 Law to Improve Employment Opportunities for Older People.
Source: own elaboration based on Hüfner & Klein (2012), Rinne & Zimmermann (2012).
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Chart 1.
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Source: own preparation based on data of Federal Employment Agency.

